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Abstract
We study higher statistical moments of Distortion for randomized social choice in a metric
implicit utilitarian model. The Distortion of a social choice mechanism is the expected approxi-
mation factor with respect to the optimal utilitarian social cost (OPT). The kth moment of Dis-
tortion is the expected approximation factor with respect to the kth power of OPT. We consider
mechanisms that elicit alternatives by randomly sampling voters for their favorite alternative. We
design two families of mechanisms that provide constant (with respect to the number of voters
and alternatives) kth moment of Distortion using just k samples if all voters can then participate
in a vote among the proposed alternatives, or 2k − 1 samples if only the sampled voters can par-
ticipate. We also show that these numbers of samples are tight. Such mechanisms deviate from a
constant approximation to OPT with probability that drops exponentially in the number of sam-
ples, independent of the total number of voters and alternatives. We conclude with simulations
on real-world Participatory Budgeting data to qualitatively complement our theoretical insights.
1 Introduction
For many problems in social choice, the number of alternatives is very large. For example, consider
the problem of voting over possible budgets in a given municipality, where the number of alternatives
is infinite (for a divisible budget) or exponential (for funding integral projects). In such settings, it
may be impractical to elicit full rankings over alternatives from every voter. Instead, we may want
to design mechanisms that only require voters to rank at most a constant number of alternatives. In
this paper, we study such mechanisms.
We consider the standard problem in social choice wherein there is a set N of n voters and a
set M of alternatives from which we must select a single winner. However, we assume that |M | is
large enough to prohibit eliciting full rankings over the alternatives. We also allow n to be large. We
adopt the implicit utilitarian perspective with metric constraints [BCH+15, CDK17, AP17, GKM17,
ABE+18, FFG16]. That is, we assume that voters have cardinal costs over alternatives, and these
costs are constrained to be metric, but voters cannot directly report cardinal costs. We want to design
social choice mechanisms to minimize the total social cost by only asking voters to rank at most a
constant number of alternatives. We measure the efficiency of a mechanism as its Distortion (see
Section 2), the worst case approximation to the total social cost.
It is easy to see that randomization is necessary to achieve constant Distortion if we cannot elicit
the ordinal preferences of voters over all alternatives. One natural form of randomization is to elicit
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alternatives by randomly sampling voters and querying them for their favorite alternatives. More
generally, in this paper we mechanisms of the following type: The set of alternatives will be the
favorite alternatives expressed by a subset of the voters. Subsequently, these alternatives are ranked
either (i) by the entire population of the voters or (ii) by a small subset of the voters. We refer to
these as the full and limited participation models respectively.
These assumptions are not merely of theoretical interest, but model social choice in emergent
domains. Assumption (i) is natural in contexts where all voters are entitled to participate in the
final election. For instance, in real-world Participatory Budgeting applications (see Section 5), a
small subset of individuals propose projects, but a much larger number participate in the subsequent
vote. Assumption (ii) models situations where we want a lightweight social choice mechanism that
only involves a small number of voters overall such as the many department level decisions made at
universities by committees representing samples of the faculty.
Prior work [AP17, GAX17, FGMP19] analyzed simple social choice mechanisms for achieving
constant Distortion. However, focusing on the expected Distortion can yield randomized mech-
anisms that can deviate significantly from their expectation ex-post, and hence may be risky to
implement in practice.
We address this problem by considering higher moments of Distortion. The kth moment of Dis-
tortion is the expected approximation factor with respect to the kth power of the optimal utilitarian
social cost. The goal of bounding higher moments of Distortion is directly analogous to providing
high probability bounds on approximation guarantees with respect to the total social cost. We note
that obtaining such a bound does not follow in a trivial manner from standard sampling arguments:
The higher moments depend on the entire distribution of the Distortion obtained by the mechanism,
and if this distribution has unbounded variance, then it is not possible to bound the second moment
by a constant with any number of samples, let alone higher moments. Moreover, it is initially unclear
how to take the “best” result out of many randomly sampled alternatives. Our key insight is that the
metric assumption enables us to derive tight bounds on higher moments with only a few samples
by using existing deterministic social choice rules to take the “best” from many randomly sampled
alternatives.
1.1 Summary of Results
Our primary contribution is the development and analysis of randomized social choice mechanisms
that achieve constant kth moment of Distortion in the metric implicit utilitarian model while requir-
ing each voter to rank at most O(k) sampled alternatives, regardless of the total number of voters
and alternatives. The normalized kth moment of Distortion is defined formally in Section 2, and our
results are summarized in Table 1. In particular, we design two families of mechanisms that have
constant kth moment of Distortion. The first asks just k randomly chosen voters for their favorite al-
ternatives, assuming all n voters can subsequently participate in a vote among these alternatives. The
second asks 2k − 1 voters for their favorite alternatives, and only these sampled voters participate
in a vote among their favorite alternatives. To the best of our knowledge, these are the first results
in implicit utilitarian social choice providing guarantees for arbitrarily high moments of Distortion
and approximating the optimal social cost with high probability.
Additionally, we show that our upper bounds on the number of samples needed are tight. We
show that the kth moment of Distortion is unbounded in the following two settings: First, when we
only sample k−1 favorite alternatives and all n voters can subsequently compare these alternatives,
and secondly, when we only sample 2k− 2 voters and the entire mechanism uses only their favorite
alternatives and their comparisons between these alternatives. From a practical perspective, we
demonstrate the value of using additional voters and alternatives: At most two additional samples
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Participation Model Lower bound Upper bound
Full k (Thm. 1) k (Thm. 2)
Limited 2k − 1 (Thm. 3) 2k − 1 (Thm. 4)
Table 1: The number of samples of favorite alternatives of voters for achieving constant normalized kth moment
of Distortion.
guarantee that another higher moment of Distortion can be bounded. Finally, in Section 5, we present
simulations on real-world Participatory Budgeting data to qualitatively complement our theoretical
insights.
1.2 Related Work
1.2.1 Metric Distortion.
The Distortion of randomized social choice mechanisms in metrics is well studied [BCH+15, AP17,
GKM17, GAX17]. The Random Dictatorship mechanism samples the favorite alternative of a single
voter, and the 2-Agree mechanism [GAX17] samples at most min(n+1,m+1) favorite alternatives
of voters. Random Dictatorship has Distortion at most 3 [AP17], and 2-Agree improves this whenm
is small. Nothing better than Random Dictatorship is known if the goal is to minimize the Distortion.
However, it is easy to show that such mechanisms do not have constant second (or higher) moment
of Distortion [FGMP19].
Using the second moment of Distortion as a proxy for risk was introduced in [FGMS17, FGMP19],
where it was shown that making one sampled voter compare the favorite alternatives of two randomly
sampled voters bounds the second moment of Distortion. In this paper, we consider the natural ques-
tion: What is the value of each additional voter in how well the Distortion concentrates? We provide
a tight characterization by bounding not just the second moment, but any higher moment of Distor-
tion.
The extreme case where k = n is the deterministic setting, where it is known that the Copeland
mechanism, or any mechanism based on choosing from the uncovered set [Mil77], yields Distortion
of 5 [ABE+18]. This bound was improved to 4.236 in [MW19] via a weighted generalization of
the uncovered set. However, both of these methods require eliciting full ordinal preferences from
voters.
1.2.2 Communication and Sample Complexity.
For a more thorough survey on the complexity of eliciting ordinal preferences to implement social
choice rules, we refer the interested reader to [BCE+16]. [CS05] comprehensively characterizes the
communication complexity (in terms of the number of bits communicated) of common deterministic
voting rules. [BCDL17] and [CP10] design social choice mechanisms with low communication
complexity when there are a small number of voters, but potentially a large number of alternatives.
[DB15, DN15] study the sample complexity of predicting the outcome of deterministic social
choice rules. However, a “sample” in this work is the entire ordinal preference list for a single
voter, whereas a sample for us is only the top alternative for a given voter. Even then, they show
that predicting the outcome of rules with small Distortion (such as Copeland) requires a number of
samples that grows with the total number of alternatives. We show that a smaller number of more
limited samples suffice to bound higher moments of Distortion.
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Recently, [MPSW19] studied a different notion of communication complexity in a non-metric
implicit utilitarian model where voters can communicate bits of information about their cardinal
preferences. In this case, the baseline is ordinal voting, and the other extreme is communicating
the entire set of cardinal utilities. They show tight results for how Distortion trades off with the
communication complexity in terms of bits of information communicated per voter. In our setting,
voters only convey ordinal information and we study the sample complexity to bound not just the
Distortion but also how well it concentrates.
2 Preliminaries
We have a set N of n voters and a set M of alternatives, from which we must choose a single
outcome. For each agent i ∈ N and alternative a ∈M , there is some underlying dis-utility d(i, a) ≥
0. Let pi = argmina∈Md(i, a), that is, pi is the favorite alternative for voter i. Ordinal preferences
are specified by a total order σi consistent with these dis-utilities (i.e., an alternative is ranked above
another only if it has lower dis-utility). A preference profile σ specifies the ordinal preferences of
all agents, and we denote σ ∈ ρ(d) to mean that σi is consistent with the dis-utilities for every i.
A deterministic social choice rule is a function f that maps a preference profile σ to an alternative
a ∈M . A randomized social choice rule maps a preference profile σ to a distribution over M .
2.1 Metric Implicit Utilitarian Model
We measure the quality of an alternative a ∈ S by its social cost, given by SC(a, d) = 1n
∑
i∈N d(i, a).
Where d is obvious from context, we will simply write SC(a). Let a∗ ∈ M be the minimizer of
social cost. The Distortion [PR06] measures the worst case approximation to the optimal social cost
of a given mechanism, in expectation for randomized mechanisms.
Definition 1. The Distortion of a social choice rule f is
Distortion(f) = sup
d, σ∈ρ(d)
Ef(σ)[SC(a, d)]
SC(a∗, d)
.
We assume that M ∪ N is a set of points in a metric space. Specifically, we assume the disu-
tility function d is the distance function over this metric space. This assumption models social
choice scenarios where there is an objective notion of the distance between alternatives. The met-
ric assumption is common in the implicit utilitarian literature [AP17, GKM17, FGMS17, GAX17,
CDK17, ABE+18, FFG16, FGMP19], and we consider an example from participatory budgeting in
Section 5 where the metric assumption is plausible.
2.2 Sampling and Higher Moments of Distortion
We consider mechanisms that implement a randomized social choice rule by first eliciting favorite
alternatives from a random sample of voters and then uses only these alternatives for the rest of the
mechanism. The size of this random sample is the sample complexity of our mechanism. We are
interested in mechanisms with constant sample complexity with respect to n and m. A mechanism
with sample complexity s only requires voters to rank at most s alternatives, so constant sample
complexities implies that the number of alternatives voters must rank is constant with respect to n
and m.
We consider two models that differ in how voters participate after we elicit these alternatives. In
the full participation model of Section 3 we allow all voters to rank the alternatives from the first
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step and we aggregate these votes to output the winner. While this requires two distinct rounds, it
is close to how real Participatory Budgeting processes work, where proposals are constructed by
a subset of the population in the first stage, and these are put to vote in the second stage. In the
limited participation model of Section 4, only the sample of voters from the first step vote over the
alternatives. Thus, mechanisms in the limited participation model do not require a second distinct
round involving different voters. It is worth noting that while the sample complexity of our results
are lower in the full participation model, the total communication complexity is higher because all
voters participate in the second round.
In order to capture the notion of risk inherent in a randomized social choice mechanism, we
consider higher statistical moments of Distortion. In order to fairly compare the bounds for different
moments, we normalize by the kth root.
Definition 2. The normalized kth moment of Distortion of a social choice rule f is
Distortionk(f) = sup
d, σ∈ρ(d)
(
Ef(σ)
[
(SC(a, d))k
])1/k
SC(a∗, d)
.
Note that by Jensen’s inequality, if a mechanism f hasDistortionk(f) ≤ c thenDistortionk′(f) ≤
c for all k′ ≤ k. By contrast, lower moments do not imply anything about higher moments of Dis-
tortion.
2.3 Relationship Between Higher Moments and High Probability Guarantees
Upper bounds on higher moments of Distortion immediately provide high probability guarantees for
approximating the optimal social cost via Markov’s inequality (see Corollaries 1 and 2). However,
one can reasonably ask whether the high probability bounds we achieve in this way are “tight.”
More precisely, suppose we want to approximate the optimal social cost with high probability:
i.e., for constant c > 1, find an alternative a such that SC(a, d) ≤ c · SC(a∗, d) with probability at
least 1− δ. How many samples (favorite alternatives of random voters) are necessary as a function
of c and δ? The example in Theorem 1 shows that one needs at least log(1/δ)log(c+1) samples in the full
participation model. On the other hand, Corollary 2 shows that our PRC mechanism needs just
log(1/δ)
log(c/11) samples (for c > 11). So our results are tight with respect to the dependence on the
probability term δ, but the factor of 11 in Corollary 1 is a consequence of the analysis for Theorem
2 and may be improvable.
3 Full Participation Model
In this section, we consider mechanisms that first elicit alternatives by sampling a number of voters
and querying them for their most preferred alternatives and then apply a social choice rule on the
elicited alternatives with all voters. We begin with the lower bound on the number of samples needed
to bound the kth moment of Distortion.
Theorem 1. Any mechanism f with sample complexity less than k hasDistortionk(f) = Ω(n1/k).
Proof. Consider a metric space with two outcomes A and B separated by distance 1. The fraction
of voters located at A is α > 1/2 and at B is 1 − α. Note that the average (per-voter) social cost
of OPT is 1 − α. If k − 1 voters are sampled, with probability (1 − α)k−1, all of them lie at B,
5
in which case any voting mechanism using these samples is run on only outcome B. Therefore, the
social cost in this case is α. The kth moment of Distortion is therefore at least:(
(1− α)k−1
(
αk
(1− α)k
))1/k
=
α
(1− α)1/k
Choosing α = 1 − c/n for constant c so that all but c voters lie at A, the above expression is
Ω(n1/k).
3.1 The PRCs Mechanism
On the constructive side, we consider a family of mechanisms that achieve constant normalized kth
moment of Distortion using the minimum possible number of samples. We call this family Partially
Random Copeland rules.
Definition 3. The Partially Random Copeland rule parameterized by positive integer s, denoted
PRCs, proceeds as follows. First sample s voters N˜ drawn independently and uniformly at random
from N with replacement. All voters in N˜ are queried for their favorite alternative, and the union
of all such alternatives is denoted M˜ . Finally, PRCs returns the winning alternative under the
Copeland social choice rule with voters N and alternatives M˜ .
In the rest of this section, we will show the following. Intuitively, Theorem 2 asserts that every
additional sample in the elicitation step of PRC provides a constant approximation to the next higher
moment of Distortion.
Theorem 2. For any n ≥ 3 voters, Distortionk(PRCk) ≤ 11 + 8n−2 , which approaches 11 as
n→∞.
As a simple consequence, using Markov’s inequality, this yields a high probability bound on
Distortion. In particular, every additional sample in the elicitation step of PRC provides a geometric
improvement in the high probability bound.
Corollary 1. As n→∞ and c > 11, the probability that PRCk outputs an alternative with social
cost more than c times that of the social optimum is at most (11/c)k.
We first present a useful lemma bounding the kth moment of the minimum of i.i.d. random
variables.
Lemma 1. Let X1, X2, . . . , Xk be drawn i.i.d. from distribution X and let µ = E[X]. Then,(
E
[
min(X1, X2, . . . , Xk)
k
])1/k ≤ µ
Proof. Let X have support d1 ≤ d2 ≤ · · · ≤ dn with probabilities ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρn. Then, µ =∑n
i=1 diρi. Let Pi =
n∑
y=i+1
ρy = Pr[X > di]. Note that P0 = 1. Let qi = ρidi and Qi =
n∑
j=i+1
ρjdj . Note that Q0 = µ and Qn = 0. Let Y = min(X1, X2, . . . , Xk). Note that
Pr[Y = di] = Pr[Y ≥ di]− Pr[Y ≥ di+1] = (Pi + ρi)k − P ki
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Therefore, we have:
E
[
Y k
]
=
n∑
i=1
dki
[
(Pi + ρi)
k − P ki
]
=
n∑
i=1
dki ρi
[ k−1∑
r=0
(
k
r + 1
)
ρriP
k−1−r
i
]
=
n∑
i=1
dki ρi
[ k−1∑
r=0
(
k
r + 1
)
ρri
( n∑
j=i+1
ρj
)k−1−r]
≤
n∑
i=1
(
diρi
) k−1∑
r=0
(
k
r + 1
)(
diρi
)r( n∑
j=i+1
ρjdj
)k−1−r
=
n∑
i=1
[
qi
k−1∑
r=0
(
k
r + 1
)
qriQ
k−1−r
i
]
=
n∑
i=1
[
(Qi + qi)
k −Qki
]
= Qk0 −Qkn = µk
We now proceed to prove Theorem 2. Let a∗ = argmina∈MSC(a) denote the social optimum.
Let µ = SC(a∗) = 1n
∑
i∈N d(i, a
∗). Suppose we sample a set S of voters. For i ∈ S, let
Xi = d(i, a
∗). Note that E[Xi] = µ, and the Xi are i, i.d. random variables.
Let m = argmini∈SXi be the voter closest to a
∗, and let am denote their favorite alternative.
Note d(m, am) ≤ Xm.
Let α = 1 + 1n−2 . Consider a ball centered at a
∗ of radius ρ = 2αµ denoted B. By Markov’s
inequality, we know that a strict majority, at least n2 + 1, of all voters lie within the ball B, since the
average distance of a voter to a∗ is µ.
Given S, suppose PRCk chooses alternative W , and suppose d(W,a∗) = βρ. We will show an
upper bound on β using the random variable Xm. Since a Copeland winner must be a member of
the uncovered set [Mil77], either a majority of voters prefer W to am, or a majority of voters must
prefer W to an alternative W ′ such that a majority of voters also prefer W ′ to am. The first case is
easier: if a majority of voters prefer W to am, then there exists a voter j ∈ B that prefers W to am.
This implies that
βρ = d(a∗,W ) ≤ d(a∗, j) + d(j, am) ≤ 2ρ+ d(a∗, am).
Recall that Xm = d(m, a∗) and d(m, am) ≤ Xm, so
βρ ≤ 2ρ+ 2Xm.
The second case yields a worse bound, so we continue the analysis in that case without loss of
generality. Let d(W ′, a∗) = β′ρ. Since a majority of voters prefer W to W ′, there is at least one
voter j ∈ B that prefers W to W ′, that is, d(j,W ) < d(j,W ′). By triangle inequality,
d(j,W ) ≥ d(a∗,W )− d(j, a∗) ≥ (β − 1)ρ
d(j,W ′) ≤ d(a∗,W ′) + d(j, a∗) ≤ (β′ + 1)ρ
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where the rightmost inequalities follow from the fact that j ∈ B =⇒ d(j, a∗) ≤ ρ. Combining the
above inequalities and assuming β > 1, we have β ≤ β′+2. Similarly, if a majority of voters prefer
W ′ to am, there exists some l ∈ B such that d(l,W ′) < d(l, am). Again, by triangle inequality:
d(l,W ′) ≥ d(a∗,W ′)− d(l, a∗) ≥ (β′ − 1)ρ
d(l, am) ≤ d(l, a∗) + d(a∗,m) + d(m, am) ≤ ρ+ 2Xm
where we used that i ∈ B and d(m,Xm) ≤ d(a∗,m) = Xm. Combining the above inequalities,
we have β′ < 2 + 2Xmρ . Since β ≤ β′ + 2, we have: β < 4 + 2Xmρ
Thus, we know that for W to win Copeland,
d(W,a∗) = βρ ≤ 4ρ+ 2Xm = 8
(
1 +
1
n− 2
)
µ+ 2Xm
By triangle inequality, and using SC(a∗) = µ, we have:
SC(W ) ≤ d(W,a∗) + SC(a∗) ≤
(
9 +
8
n− 2
)
µ+ 2Xm
Setting γ =
(
9 + 8n−2
)
µ, we have:
E[SC(W )k] ≤ E[(γ + 2Xm)k] =
k∑
r=0
(
k
r
)
γk−r E[Xrm]2r
Since Xm is the minimum of k i.i.d. random variables with mean µ, applying Lemma 1, we have
E[Xkm] ≤ µk. Applying Jensen’s inequality, for r ≤ k, we have
E[Xrm] = E[(Xkm)r/k] ≤ E[Xkm]r/k = (µk)r/k = µr.
Therefore, we have
E[SC(W )k] ≤
k∑
r=0
(
k
r
)
γk−r(2µ)r =
(
11 +
8
n− 2
)k
µk
Therefore , we have Distortionk(PRCk) ≤ 11 + 8n−2 , completing the proof of Theorem 2.
4 Limited Participation Model
In this section, we consider mechanisms that sample some number of voters, query the voters for
their most preferred alternatives, and then hold an election on just the sample of voters. We first
show that limiting participation in this way necessarily increases the sample complexity.
Theorem 3. Any anonymous limited participation randomized mechanism with sample complexity
less than 2k − 1 has Distortionk(f) = Ω(n1/k).
Proof. Consider the same instance as Theorem 1. Suppose we sample 2k − 2 voters. Then the
probability that we sample an equal number of voters located at A and B is(
2k − 2
k − 1
)
αk−1(1− α)k−1 ≥ (2α)k−1(1− α)k−1 ≥ (1− α)k−1
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where we have assumed α ≥ 1/2. In this event, since there is no majority of voters in the sample
that prefer either alternative, we assume that any anonymous mechanism outputs B with probability
at least 1/2, so that the social cost is at least α2 . Therefore, the k
th moment of distortion is at least:(
(1− α)k−1
(
(α/2)k
(1− α)k
))1/k
=
α
2(1− α)1/k
Choosing α = 1 − c/n for constant c so that all but c voters lie at A, the above expression is
Ω(n1/k).
4.1 The FRCs Mechanism
Complementing the above impossibility, we show that sample complexity of 2k−1 is also sufficient
to achieve constant kth moment of Distortion. In particular, we define another family of social
choice rules called Fully Random Copeland.
Definition 4. TheFully RandomCopeland rule parameterized by positive integer s, denotedFRCs
proceeds as follows. First samples s voters N˜ drawn independently and uniformly at random from
N with replacement. All voters in N˜ are queried for their favorite alternative, and the union of all
such alternatives is denoted M˜ . Finally, FRCs returns the winning alternative under the Copeland
social choice rule with voters N˜ and alternatives M˜ .
In the rest of this section, we will show the following. Intuitively, Theorem 4 says that every
additional two voters participating in FRC provide a constant approximation to the next higher
moment of Distortion.
Theorem 4. Distortionk(FRC2k−1) ≤ 17.
Again, as a consequence of Markov’s inequality, we have the following high probability bound.
In particular, every additional two voters in FRC provide a geometric improvement in the high
probability bound.
Corollary 2. For c ≥ 17, the probability that FRC2k−1 outputs an alternative with social cost
more than c times that of the social optimum is at most (17/c)k.
As in Section 3, we first present a result on bounding the kth moment of a function of i.i.d.
random variables; this time the function is the median instead of the minimum.
Lemma 2. Let X1, X2, . . . , X2k−1 be drawn i.i.d. from distribution X and let µ = E[X]. Let Y
denote the median of X1, X2, . . . , X2k−1 . Then,
(
E[Y k]
)1/k ≤ 4µ.
Proof. We follow the same structure as the proof of Lemma 1. LetX have support d1 ≤ d2 ≤ · · · ≤
dn with probabilities ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρn and let Pi =
n∑
y=i+1
ρy . If Y = di, then there exists a subset of
k values from X1, X2, . . . , X2k−1 whose minimum is di. Using the expression for the probability
of the minimum of k values from Lemma 1, the probability of the latter event can be upper bounded
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as:
Pr[Y = di] ≤
(
2k − 1
k
)
Pr[Min of k draws from X = di]
=
(
2k − 1
k
)[
(Pi + ρi)
k − P ki
]
=⇒ E[Y k] ≤
(
2k − 1
k
) n∑
i=1
dki
[
(Pi + ρi)
k − P ki
]
.
From the proof of Lemma 1,
∑n
i=1 d
k
i
[
(Pi + ρi)
k − P ki
] ≤ µk. Therefore we have:
E[Y k] ≤
(
2k − 1
k
)
µk ≤
(
2k
k
)
µk ≤ (1 + 1)2kµk = (4µ)k
We will also need the following straightforward property of the Copeland Rule.
Lemma 3. Suppose there are 2k − 1 alternatives and voters. We construct a tournament graph on
the alternatives where there is a directed edge from alternative S to alternative T if at least k voters
strictly prefer S to T . Then the Copeland rule always picks an alternative W with in-degree strictly
less than k.
We now proceed to prove Theorem 4. As in the proof of Theorem 2, let a∗ denote the optimal
alternative, and let SC(a∗) = µ = 1n
∑
i∈N d(i, a
∗). Suppose we sample a subset of voters, S of
size 2k − 1 For i ∈ S, let Xi = d(i, a∗). Order these voters so that X1 ≤ X2 ≤ · · · ≤ X2k−1 and
let m be the voter that corresponds to the median of this sequence. Let Y = d(m, a∗). Note from
Lemma 2 that E[Y k] ≤ (4µ)k.
Suppose the Copeland rule chooses an alternative W , and suppose d(W,a∗) = αY . We will
find an upper bound for α. Consider the ball centered around a∗ with radius Y ; call this B. By
definition, at least k agents in S lie within B. Note that for any j ∈ B ∩S, d(j, aj) ≤ d(j, a∗) ≤ Y .
Therefore, for j, l ∈ B ∩ S, we have
d(j, al) ≤ d(j, a∗) + d(l, a∗) + d(l, al) ≤ Y + Y + Y = 3Y
Now, for j ∈ B ∩ S, we have
d(j,W ) ≥ d(a∗,W )− d(j, a∗) ≥ (α− 1)Y
If α > 4, then combining the above two observations, we have that for all j, l ∈ B, we have
d(j, al) ≤ 3Y < d(j,W ). This means that the set of at least k voters in B ∩ S strictly prefer all of
the favorite alternatives {al, l ∈ B ∩ S} to W . From Lemma 3, this means that W cannot be the
Copeland winner. Thus, forW to win in the Copeland rule, we must have α ≤ 4 so d(W,a∗) ≤ 4Y .
By triangle inequality,
SC(W ) ≤ SC(a∗) + d(a∗,W ) ≤ µ+ 4Y
Using Jensen’s inequality in a fashion similar to the proof of Theorem 2, and using E[Y k] ≤ (4µ)k
we have:
E[SC(W )k] ≤ E[(µ+ 4Y )k] ≤
k∑
r=0
(
k
r
)
µk16r = 17kµk
so we have that Distortionk(FRC2k−1) ≤ 17. This completes the proof of Theorem 4.
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5 Empirical Simulation
In this section, we augment our theoretical worst case analysis with a qualitative empirical demon-
stration of the concentration achieved by the PRC and FRC mechanisms on real world data. We use
data from the Participatory Budgeting project; see [GKSA15]. In this domain, there are a number
of public projects (such as new sidewalks, park renovations, etc.). Each project has a monetary
cost, and we want to select a set of projects subject to not exceeding a total budget. In participatory
budgeting, local community members vote directly over their preferred projects, and these votes are
aggregated to decide which projects to fund.
We consider knapsack voting data [GKSA15], where each voter reports the set of projects they
most prefer, subject to the total budget constraint. This makes knapsack voter data particularly
useful for us: voters select their single alternative out of a very large space, the power set of projects.
Because we also have information about the latent combinatorial space (specific projects selected
and their costs), we can impose simplistic but natural notions of distance to allow us to simulate our
mechanisms and study their performance with respect to the imposed distance.
Simulation. It is important to note that this is a simulation; actually running our mechanisms
does not require specifying a notion of distance, and we do not know how these voters would have
responded to ordinal queries in reality. We are treating an entire budget allocation as a single out-
come and imputing preferences of voters over these outcomes. This reduces the problem to single
winner election over a large space of alternatives in keeping with the theoretical model in the pa-
per. Therefore, natural baseline mechanisms are single winner rules with small sample complexity,
particularly Random Dictatorship which is the best-known mechanism with respect to the first mo-
ment of Distortion. Other mechanisms for participatory budgeting are tailored to specific models of
voter preferences over the combinatorial space of projects, and do not, in general, provide constant
Distortion guarantees for arbitrary metrics.
Setup. We consider two simple notions of distance: budget distance and Jaccard distance. Suppose
there are p public projects numbered 1, . . . , p with costs c1, . . . , cp, and there is a total budget of B.
A feasible budget is a set of projects P such that
∑
i∈P cp ≤ B. The budget distance between
budgets P and Q is 1 − 1B
∑
i∈P∩Q ci. The Jaccard distance between P and Q is 1 − |P∩Q||P∪Q| . The
social cost of a given budget is the average distance to the proposed budgets of the voters. We use
knapsack voting data from the Participatory Budgeting election held in Cambridge, MA, USA in
2015. There were 945 voters, 23 projects (implying 223 > 8 million possible budgets), and a total
budget constraint of $600, 000.
Results. In Figure 1, we present the box plots of the distributions of social cost of PRC and FRC
alongside Random Dictatorship (RD) when simulating using budget distance and Jaccard distance
respectively. The RD mechanism samples a single most preferred alternative uniformly at random
and has Distortion at most 3 [AP17], which is asymptotically the best known bound for any ran-
domized social choice mechanism for arbitrary metrics. The examples qualitatively verify that the
PRC and FRC mechanisms do provide substantial concentration in terms of the approximation to
the optimal social cost. Furthermore, in practice we observe better average performance of PRC
and FRC over that of RD, despite RD’s theoretical optimality with respect to the first moment of
Distortion. The results also show that FRC requires more samples to achieve similar performance
as PRC. To summarize, even on real datasets, just a few additional samples provide substantially
improved concentration.
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Figure 1: Distribution of approximation to optimal social cost for 1,000 runs of each mechanism on Cambridge
2015 knapsack voting data using budget distance (top) and Jaccard distance (bottom).
6 Future Directions
There are several avenues of future research. Our mechanisms involve first sampling some alter-
natives and then putting them to vote. Is there a truly one-shot mechanism that can bound higher
moments of Distortion while only eliciting a constant amount of information from each voter with
respect to the number of alternatives? Our intuition is that this should be impossible. Also, though
our sample complexity bounds are tight, the exact constant in the Distortion bounds can likely be
improved. However, this improvement may be nontrivial: We do not use the Distortion of Copeland
as a black box, so results such as [MW19] do not directly improve our bounds. As in [MPSW19], it
would be interesting to analyze the effect of bits of cardinal information on the sample complexity.
For instance, what if we sample fewer voters, but these voters could express limited cardinal infor-
mation? In a related vein, could methods that make voters interact like [FGMS17] help reduce the
sample complexity of the process?
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